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Every great thinker, according to Martin Heidegger,
only thinks one single thought, through which various
fundamental problems are investigated.1 For Heidegger,
this single thought is unequivocally the thought of Being.
This Being-question (Seinsfrage) remains the constant
leitmotif in the philosophical development of Heidegger.
From the early stage of delineating the question through
the existential analysis of Dasein to the later stage of
focusing Being in truth, thought and language, the Being-
question is the backbone for each step of investigation.
The Being-question also leads Heidegger back to the origin
of western philosophy in the pre-Socratics. As a result,
Heidegger claims that the Being-question was forgotten wit:
the advent of Plato and Aristotle. This very forgetfulness
of Being bears serious consequence to the whole history of
western philosophy. Philosophy and at the same time, meta-
physics, from Plato to Nietzsche have gone astray insofar
as these great philosophers conceive philosophy and meta-
physics in terms of beings but not Being. Hence in order
2to _ask the Being-question afresh, a destruction of
the history of ontology is required. In all, Heidegger
aims at an overcoming of metaphysics so as to found
an entirely different mode of philosophizing for a new
beginning in philosophy.2
Such is the bold ambition of Heidegger. At once,
he finds himself standing against the whole tradition of
western philosophy, consoled only by the distant thought
of Parmenides and Heraclitus. My task here is not to
evaluate the ambition and its accomplishment of Heidegger's
philosophy. Indeed an assessment of the entire philosophy
of Heidegger remains a controversial and unfinished task.
The reason, according to Otto Poggeler, is that a presen-
tation of the historical development of Heidegger's thought
is not yet possible, because Heidegger's work has been
published only in a very fragmentary and accidental on
arbitrary manner.3 Heidegger-interpretation, like the
interpretation of Kant and Hegel, is still awaiting accom-
plishment.
MMIy task here is to explore the early work of Heidegger
for an understanding of the meaning of the Being-question.
By early work, I includes works composed but not necessarily
published before the famous reversal (Kehre) in Heidegger's
philosophy roughly around the Letter on Humanism in 1947.
3
This.reversal, according to Heidegger, was anticipated
in an earlier lecture on the Essence of Truth (composed
in 1930 but was published in 1.91-3) in which some insight
into the thought of the reversal from Being and Time
to Time and Being was given. The meaning of this
reversal, Heidegger says, is not a change from the
standpoint of Sein and Zeit, but in it the intended thought
for the first time attains the place of the dimension from
which Being and Time is experienced and indeed, experienced
from the basic experience of Being. Subsequently, this
change of thought serves as a basis for some interpreters
of Heidegger, notably William Richardson to distinguish
Heidegger's philosophical development into two phases: the
so-called Heidegger I and Heidegger II. Richardson maintains
that the reversal indeed marks a distinction between two
phases of the experience of the Being-question. Though the
same problem preoccupies both phases, the methods differ,
Characte r'istic of Heidegger II is the process of thought,
of Heidegger_ I the process of phenomenology. 5 Heideg..er I
begins the problem with Being and Time in which the exist-
ential analytic of Dasein serves as the transcendental
horizon for the Being-question. Care (Sorge) and finally
temporality are elucidated as the Being of Dasein. In other
words, the Being-question in Heidegger I proceeds in an
4
explication of the finitude of Dasein thus singling out
fundamental ontology as the primary concern of this stage.
The focus gradually shifts to the problem of truth in
of Being.terms of a-letheia as the process
No longer is Basein the centre of the focus. The problem
now for Heidegger !I is the process of thought.
This brief discussion of the problem of reversals in
Heidegger's philosophy indicates that there are not two
different philosophies of Heidegger. The conception of
the early and the later Heidegger only makes sense if we
keep in mind that this distinction is but a methodological
change inside an unitary problematic. In Heidegger`s words,
The distinction you (Richardson) make between Heidegger I
and II is justified only on the condition that this is
kept constantly in mind: only by way of what Heidegger I
has thought does one gain access to what is to-be thought
by Heidegger II. But the thought of Heidegger I became
possible only if it is contained in Heidegger II.
My purpose here is to introduce Heidegger's thought
in terms of his problematic, thus setting a stage for ente-
ring into a deeper understanding of Heidegger's philosophy.
Hence my task is rather limited. I am not going into details
of the existential analytic of Dasein in Being and Time nor
do I discuss the relationship between Hieidegger and the
existentialist movement. I contend that to interpret
Heidegger as an existentialist would miss the entire
5
philosophical significance of Heidegger's thought. I
shall confine myself within a preliminary discussion
around a few concepts which I. think are pre-requisite
for any understanding of Heidegger's problem of Being.
I shall focus on three problem areas: the Being-question
and the problem of fundamental ontology the fundamental
problem of metaphysics and the ontological difference.
6CHAPTER TWO
THE BEING-QUESTION AND THE PROB nF
FUNDAD' ENTAL ONTOLOGY
1. THE EARLY EXPERIENCE OF THE RF,TN('Y-nTTRPMTnW
Heidegger recalls his first experience of the Being-
question in reading Brentano's dissertation: On the Mani-
fold Sense of Being in Aristotle (1862). The quotation of
Aristotle's phrase on the title page of Brentano's disser-
tation gave the first impetus for Heidegger's meditation
on the problem of Being. Heidegger translates Aristotle's
phrase: A being becomes manifest (sc. with regard to its
Being) in many ways.' Implicit in this sentence is the
Being-question that determined the entire philosophical
development of Heidegger. The question is conceived as:
What is the pervasive, simple, unified determination of
Being that permeates all of its mutiple meanings? This
question raised others: What, then, does Being mean? To
what extent (why and how) does the Being of beings unfold
in the four modes which Aristotle constantly affirms, but
whose common origin he leaves undetermined? One need but
run over the names assigned to them in the language of the
philosophical tradition to be struck by the fact that they
seem, at first, irreconcilable: Being as property, Being
as possibility and actuality, Being as truth, Being as
scheme of the Categories. What sense of Being comes to
expression in these lour headings? How can they be brought
into comprehensible accord? This accord cannot be grasped
without first raising and settling the question: Whence
does Being as such2(not merely beings as beings) receive
its determination?
7
Central to these questions is Heidegger's insight
that metaphysics from Aristotle to the present age has
not resolved the problem of Being but dissolved it in
terms of property, possibility and actuality, truth and
schema of the categories. Indeed, the first fully form-
ulated metaphysical question is in Aristotle's Metaphysics
namely, what are beings as beings? Aristotle's treatment
of this question brings forth the dominant characteristics
in all the subsequent metaphysical thinking. The questions
what are beings as beings? resolves itself into two
directions. On the one hand, the investigation of the
being-ness (ousca) of beings becomes the central theme of
ontology. On-the other hand, the seeking of the ultimate.
and highest ground for beings is the effort of theology.
Hence Heidegger conceives that the history of metaphysics
bears the onto-then-logical structure.
Metaphysics is ontology in that it thinks Being as the
first and most universal ground common to all beings.
Metaphysics is theology in that it thinks Being as the
highest ground above all beings, ultimately as the ground
of itself, causa sui, which is the metaphysical concept of
God. Metaphysics is thus in its very nature onto-then-logic.3
It is precisely the onto-theo-logical nature of meta-
physics which blurs the distinction between Being and beings
(The ontological difference, to be treated in a later chapter).
Hence H id eg g er  ventures t o ask again the meaning cf
Being hidden i n meetjapiiysics.
The i nitial conc-eption of the Being-question i s by 
no means clear and will f m elated*. Three insights 
subsequently became  decisive for Heidegger i n the deve- 
lopment of the Bi i negtdquestioru
1) Heidegger receives si gnificant help from the phenomen-
ological method tf Hiaeserl whi ch anictia ipates the conception 
of pb.t.nomqnology in Being and Time. The etymological mean- 
ings of phenomqnology go back to the though  o f  the ancient 
G r e e k : p h e n o m q n o n  (           ) i s  c o n c e
i v e d  a s " t o  s h o witself " ; and l ogos(          )m e a n s  "t o  m a k e  m a n ife s t "
2) By a renewed study of Aristotle, Heidegger oiatains ithe 
insiglit of truth as non-concealments This conception iff 
aiJte t h e ± R n ( 0 ( , _  as a process of revealment, to which 
e.ll scelff-manifes七a七ion cf bciings pertains, a.ci七er
the conmcstone tor the umderstanding cf ithe truth cf 
5) F inally, witth ithe insiglit cf aletheia，Hiddegger cmaes
A 一
ic〇 grips wi th "the Cmm  niesia (O O ^t^), the Being of beings,
• 6meaning;: presence.
The three i nsights: the ccncciceptions of aletheia as 
non-concelament; ousia a s presence; ?and to gether  wi t h  phen- 
omenology are gradually taken  up  as  the  gui ding principles
r
9of the Being-question. However it is sufficed for us at
the present moment to understand the initial problematic
of Heidegger at the earliest stage by proceeding now to
the discussion of the Being-question in Being and Time.
II. THE BEING-QUESTION IN BEING AND TIME
A. PRESUPPOSITIONS AND PREJUDICES OF THE BEING-QUESTION
In the very beginning of Being and Time, Heidegger
states simply that the question of Being should be raised
anew. Accordingly, the purpose of Being and Time is to
work out the question of the meaning of Being and to do
so concretely. Our provisional aim is the interpretation
of time as the possible horizon for any understanding what-
soever of Being. "7
However, the question of Being is constantly neglected
in traditional ontology due to the existence of presupposi-
tions and prejudics which render the question unnecessary.
Thus certain presuppositions and prejudics must be clarified
first in order to clear the wav for the Being-question.
According to Heidegger, there are three presuppositions.
1. The first presupposition maintains that Being is the
most universal concept. Inherent in this presuppositions
is the ambiguity concerning the unity of Being as over
against the multiplicity of categories, applicable to
10
things"8 The universality of Being cannot be conceived
in terms of class or genus. However, Heidegger contends
that 'An understanding of Being is already included in
conceiving anything which one apprehends as an entity (a
being)*'9 Heidegger concludes that Being is the darkest
concept of all simply because there is no clear conceptual-
ization of the concept.
2. The second prejudice refers to the indefinability of the
meaning of Being. It is because Being cannot be derived
from higher concepts by definition, nor can it be presented
through lower ones. The reason is that Being cannot be
conceived, as a being.
* The word Seiendes is one of the most important words in
Heidegger's philosophical terminology. Over aginst Seien-
des is Seim (Being). Literally ein Seiendes means
something which is, In English translations of Heidegger's
work, there exist a number of different renditions of the
word. Macquarries Robinson render it as entity in Being
and Time Werner Brock as What-is in Existence and B
and in An Introduction to Metaphysics and Kant and the pro-
blem of metaphysic, the translators translate it into
essent. However, in order to comply with the later Heide-
gger translations, notably by Joan Stambaugh and the termin-
ology employed by William Richardson, I adopt their rendering
Seiendes as being and s!Seinu as Being (always with a
capital letter B). I regard this is closer to Heidegger's
.intention to show the ontological difference between beings
and Being's. They are ontologically different yet they
are not distinctly seperated from each other. Indeed, this
is only one of the many confusion arising from the English
translations of Heidegger's work. Such confusion contribute
more difficulties than help in understanding Heidegger. We
still lack an unified Heidegger terminology in English.
11
If this is the case then it cannot be defined in terms
of traditional logic. The indefinability of Being does
not eliminate the question of its meaning it demands
that we look that question in the face. x,10
3. The final presupposition considers that Being is a
self-evident concept. Everyday discourse demonstrates
the application of Being in various ways. Heidegger
regards such average kind of intelligibility in applying
Being as the enigmatic character of man's a priori
comportment with Being. The very fact that we already
live in an understanding of Being and that the meaning of
Being is still veiled in darkness proves that it is neces-
sary in principle to raise this question again11
Hence the universal, undefinable and self-evident
nature of Being in traditional philosophy not only lacks
any definite answer for itself but also obscures the very
question of Being itself.
B. DASEIN* AS THE LOCUS OF THE BEING-QUESTION
The self-evident nature of the concept of Being ment-
Dasein is another most important term in Heidegger's
philosophy. Literally it means There-Being which is
employed by Richardson as its translation. However, because
of the wide acceptance in its German form by most philosophers
and in most translations, I shall leave Dasein untranslated
throughout.
12
ioned as the third presupposition in turn is the starting
point of asking the Being-question. Average understanding
of Being in everyday discourse (eg: I am sick, the sky is
blue, etc) reveals the vague and ambiguous comportment of
man with Being. This comprehension of Being by man, no
matter how vague, according to Richardson, becomes the
basic presupposition of Heidegger.12 The inquiry of the
meaning of Being leads one into the hermeneeutical nature
of questioning.
Hermeneutically speaking, every inquiry, so a seeking,
is guided beforehand by what is sought. The questioning of
what the meaning of Being is is questioned by a being iv-hose
vague comprehension of Being is evident. It is because
even if we ask, what is Being? we have already had some
understanding of the is. In other words, if we do not
comprehend somehotivr the answer, we could not ask what Being
means. Thus the Being-question at this stage reduces itself
to this: What is the essence of the comprehension of Being
rooted so deeply in Man?13
The preliminary stage of the Being-question is set: man
is the being to be interrogated because of his pre-concep-
tual comprehension of Being.
13
However, it does not mean that man is to be inves-
tigated as an entity (a being). Heidegger is by no means
interested in any scientific or humanistic research on
the nature of man, not even in a philosophical anthropo-
logy. Instead man is conceived precisely by the very
comprehension of Being.
Yet if this com rehension of Bein did not occur, man could
never be the essent that e is, no matter how wonderful his
faculties. Man is an essent in the midst of other essents
in such a way that the essent that he is and the essent that
he is not are always already manifest to him.
Such a-conception of man is most important in Heidegger's
philosophy in which man is not conceived of in terms of
nature or essence as in traditional philosophy but rather
is understood as a being standing open in Being. The com-
prehension and asking the meaning of Being by man are but
modes of Being. Hence, Heidegger designates the term Dasein
to the unique characteristics of man, the questioner of
Being. Man is the Dat (there) in Sein (Being). This
mode of Being is termed as existence* The significance of
this designation of the Being of man as Dasein lies in
The term existence in Heidegger's philosophy engenders
much confusion in interpretation of Heidegger in relation
to the Existentialist movement. To avoid misunderstanding,
Heidegger later emplo: s the term ex-si stence, so as to
differentiate the term from existence as used by the exis-
tentialists, notably Sartre, and from the traditional conce-
ption of existence as existentia, which Heidegger terms as
present-at-hand
14
Heidegger's decisive turn away from the terms existentia
and essentia pertaining to the conception of substance
and subject in the history of metaphysics. Existentia
in traditional metaphysics is conceived as that it is
whereas essentia means what it is Heidegger maintains
that man cannot be understood in terms of what and
that because such categorization of man covers up the
unique way of man's comportment with Being, thus rendering
him into a being.
Further clarification of the meaning of existence
is required because in section 9 of Being and Time there
appears two apparently paradoxical sentences: The 'essence'
[,'wesen'J of this entity lies in its to be [zu-seinJ
and The 'essence' of casein lies in its existence.15
Misinterpretation of these two sentences leads one to con-
clude that Heidegger is an existentialist, and in particu-
lar, one tends to identify Sartre's formula of existentia-
lism: Existence precedes essence with Heidegger's. However,
Heidegger indicates on the same page that this term does
not and cannot have the ontological signification of the
traditional term existentia 1116 To be sure, this misinter-
pretation is understandable because the juxtaposition of
essence (Wesen) and existence in the formula is too
15
easily to be interpreted in the existentialist manner.
Yet how is essence (Wesen) to be understood? t°Jesen,
like the term existence, is denied to be equivalent
to the traditional term essential' in metaphysics. In
Letter on Humanism, Heidegger explains,
this (the formula Das rWesen des Daseins liegt in
seiner Existenz) is not a matter of opposing existentia
and essentia, because these two metaphysical determinat-
ions of Being have not yet been placed in question, let
alone their relationship.... The sentence says rather:
man is essentially such that he is Here (Da),ie, within
the clearing of Being. This Being of the Here, and only
this, has the basic trait of ex-sistence:le, it stands
outside itself within the truth of Being.
It is clear that Wesen does not mean essence.
According to Adamczewski, the term Wesen is better rend-
ered as way to be. Hence the whole sentence is re-tran-
slated: the way to be of the human being lies in its ek-
sistence.18 Existences in Heidegger's thought must always
refer to the Being of man in such a way that- man stands in
a unique openness to Being.
Existence therefore is a term designated only to
the Being of man. Rocks, horses and Angels are, but they
do not exist. God is, but he does not exist. Only man
exists. However, this does not mean that man is the only
real being while the other beings are unreal and mere
appearances or human ideas. Heidegger further explains
the meaning of man's existence in the introduction of What
16
is iIetaphysics? The proposition man exists means: man
is that being whose Being is distinguished by the open-
standing standing-in in the unconcealedness of Being,
from Being, in Being. 19
The open-standing standing-in in the unconcealed-
ness of Being from Being in Being of Basein is ther:matized
as the problematic of the existential analytic in Being
and Time. The unity of the existential structure of Dasein
is termed as Care (Sorge), from which the meaning of
standing-in is derived. iJasein, conceived as Being-in-
the world is delineated further into an ontological struc-
tural whole. The Being of Dasein means: ahead-of-itself-
Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alonside (entities
encountered within the world).20 The reason for such an
awkward hyphenated expression is to insist on the structurl
unity of possibility, throwness and falleness of Dasein.
These three primordial ontological structures in turn are
grounded in temporality. Corresponding to possibility,
throwness and falleness are the temporal modes of the future,
the past and the present. Thus time is conceived as the
meaning of care.
Heidegger's task in Being and Time is to provide a
preparatory stage for the Being-question. It is indicated
17
in the beginning of Being and Time that time would. be
conceived as the horizon for understanding of Being and
for any way of interpreting it.... time needs to be
explicated primordially as the horizon for the understa-
nding of Being, and in terms of temporality as the Being
of Dasein, which understands Being. 21
The purpose of singling out Dasein as the locus for
the Being-question is most crucial for the early enter-
prise of Heidegger. The existential analytic of Dasein
demonstrated in Being and Time is a careful programmatic
to substantiate the claim that Dasein is completely diff-
erent from all the previous understanding of man in terms
of subjectivity, consciousness, subject or ego. It is
significant because any rendering of the Being of man into
the above categories would means a recourse to a mode of
thought which represent man as beings without elucidating
the Being of man. It has already been demonstrated that
Dasein has a previlege of comprehending Being. This
becomes Heidegger's crucial conjecture the involvement
2of Being in human nature is an essential feature of Being. 2
To discern the human nature in terms of its involvement of
Being should be free from the determination of human nature
18
as subjectivity and the animal rationale, otherwise
human nature is once again interpreted in humanistic
terms.
But how is such human nature conceived? We must
be contended at the early stage that the conclusion of
Being and Time only provides a preparatory step for the
question of Being. Care and Time are the two meanings
of the Being of Dasein. Moreover, time serves as the
horizon for any understanding of Being. Hence the Being-
question culminates at the first stage of Heidegger's
programmatic in working out the Temporality of Being. The
inner possibility of such a task must be sought in the
laying bare of the Being-constitution of Dasein. Human
nature so conceived, refers precisely to the Being-
constitution of Dasein.
However, inherent in the existential analytic of Dasein,
is the major problematic of Heidegger's philosophy. The
unvieling of the existential structure of Dasein by no means
aims at an existentialist account of human existence. In
order to proceed with the Being-question from the preparatory
step set in Being and Time, Heidegger find the task of
destroying the history of ontology necessary. The Being-
question must be made transparent against the tradition of
19
western metaphysics: how did the previous great philo-
sophers by-pass the Being-question in their metaphysics?
In other words, the forgetfulness of Being in the history
of meatphysics means that metaphysics has forgotten its
ground. Hence the question is: how i s tie ground of meta-
physics disclosed? How does the Being-constitution of
Dasein relate to the ground of metaphysics?
The last question hence becomes the problematic of
fundamental ontology.
III. THE PROBLEM OF FUNDAT NENTAL ONTOLOGY
A. THE QUESTION WHAT IS MAN?
According to Richardson, the exclusive preoccupation
of Heidegger from the very beginning, has been to lay a
foundation of metaphysics. 23 This task is illuminated in
the early works of Heidegger (Being and Time and Kant and
the Problem of Metaphysics) as the problem of foundamental
ontology.
* It may be necessary to point out here that, I-ieictegger
virtually abandoned the term Fundamental Ontolgoy after
1930. Heidegger later explained his rejection of the term
in Letter on Humanism and the introduction of What is meta-
physics?would be misleading if the term fundamental onto-
logy is deployed. Fundamental ontology is still an onto-
logy yet to be overcome
20
By fundamental ontology is meant that ontological analytic
of man's finite essence which should prepare the foundation
for the metaphysics which belongs to human nature. Fund-
amental ontology is that metaphysics of human Dasein neces-
sary if metaphysics in general is to be possible..... To
analyze the idea of fundamental ontology means: To set forth
the ontological analytic of vasein as a prerequisite and to
make clear to what purpose and in what manner on what basis
and under what presupposition it puts the concrete question:
What is man?25
For Kant, the question What is man? is the very center
to which all the preceding three questions: What can I know
it What should I do? and What may I hope? are reduced.
The three questions correspond to the domain of metaphysica
specialis. What can I know? refers to the possibility of
knowledge of nature in general usually falling in the class-
ical realm of cosmology. The second question deals with the
personality and freedom of man's activity and this is con-
cerned with psychology. The last one directs man's hope
towards immorality and God, hence is theology. 26 Cosmology,
psychology and theology traditionally belong to Netaphysica
Specialis. According to Heidegger, it is Kant's basic aim
to ground the inner possibility of IIetaphysica Specialis
into the essence of man. Basically, all these can be class-
ified under anthropology, since the first three are related
to the last.27 The question What is man? clearly is not
concerned with the rational nature of man since it is dealt
in psychology instead but it goes deeper and is conceived
21
as a problematic of philosophical anthropology in which
the foundation of metaphysics is grounded. The question
what is man? is the central theme of Heidegger's re-
treive* of Kant's problem of Metaphysics. Heidegger
tries to demonstrate in the first three sections of the
Kant-Book that Kant' s Critique of Pure Reason is not a
treatise on the theory of knowledge, nor just a mere
critique of metaphysics, rather ant's purpose, Heidegger
contends, is to lay the ground of metaphysics. The open-
ning sentence of the Kant-book makes explicit Heidegger's
aim: The task of the following investigation is to expli-
cate Kant' s Critique of Pure Reason as a laying of the
fundation of metaphysics in order to present the problem
of metaphysics as the problem of a fundamental ontology.28
* tt e-trieve (Wiederholung) is another significant term
employed by Heidegger to refer the re-asking of the funda-
mental problems. The whole destruction of western ontology
may be understood as a Re-trieve. James S. Churchill tran-
slated the world into repetition. In Kant and the Problem
of Metaphysics. On page 211, the definition of the term is
given: By a repetition of a fundamental problem are under-
stand the disclosure of the primordical possibilities conc-
ealed it. The development of these possibilities has the
effect of transformingthe problem and thus preserving it in
its import as a problem. To preserve a problem means to free
and to safeguard its intrinsic powers, which are the sources
of its essence and which make it possible as a problem.
22
Taking the conclusions of the controversial Heide-
ggerean interpretations of Kant's Critique as basis, I
shall limit my discussion to the relationship between
the question, What is man? and fundamental ontology
found in section four of the Kant-Book.
B. THE LAYING OF THE FOUNDATION OF METAPHYSICS AS THE
PROBLEM OF FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY
According to Heidegger, the meaning of Kant's Cop-
ernican Revolution has been constantly misunderstood and
misinterpreted. The usual rendering of the meaning is
that the object of knowledge conforms to the activity of
subjectivity. However, Heidegger argues that this is not
Kant' s aim in the Critique of Pure -Reason. He quotes Kant
from the Preface to Second Edition:
Hitherto it has been assumed that all our kn.owledge must
conform objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge
of objects by establishing something in regard to them a
priori, by as men of concepts, have, on this assumption,
ended in failure. We must, therefore, make trial whether
we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics
if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge.
This would agree better with what is desired, namely, that
it should be possible to have knowledge of objects a priori
deterni g something in regard to them prior to their being
given.29
The last sentence is crucial, because Heidegger trans-
lates this into the language of Being and Time. By this
23
Kant means: not all knowledgeis ontic,and where such
knowledge is given, it is possible through ontological
knowledge113° For Kant, the inner possibility of meta-
physica Specialis is grounded in the problem of Meta-
generalis ie. ontology as such. The reason, Heidegger
explains, is that the possibility of ontic knowledge
(meta_ hysica specialis) lies in a prior comprehension of
the ontological structure of these beings (objects of
metaphysica specialis). This is the proper meaning of the
Copernican Revolution. According to Richardson, the
Revolution means: that ontic knowledge is rendered
possible only by an ontological comprehension that precedes
it and resides in the very structure of the knower.31 Pure
reason, as man's capacity to know according to a priori
principles, becomes the very structure of the knower to be
delimited and delineated. Thus Fundamental ontology for
Kant had to be a Critique of Pure Reason.32 Such a critique
essentially is an analysis of the transcendence of Human
mind insofar as the problem is centered around how the mind
goes beyond itself and knows its object. However, the
essential characteristics of the transcendence of the human
mind precisely lies in its finitude. Human reason, because
of its finitude, can never create the object of its know-
ledge.
24
Heidegger takes over the Kantian Critique as essentially
a critique of the finite transcendence of the human mind.
For Kant, metaphysics is indeed untenable because its
claim for knowledge beyond experience is proved illusory.
However, Kant has indicated that man has a natural pro-
pensity for metaphysics. Thus Heidegger maintains that
the inner possibility of metaphysics lies in a disclosure
of the natural propensity of man. The three basic
questions: What can I know? What should I do? and What may
I hope? which give rise to metaphysica specialis as cosmo-
logy, psychology and theology respectively, must be emerged
from the natural propensity of man. Hence, all these
questions lead to the fourth What is man?
Heidegger endorses the Kantian insistence upon the
finitude of man. These questions bring forth the problems of
a power (What can I know?), a duty (What should I do?) and
a hope (What may I hope?) of human reason. To ask the
questions is to admit a non-power over the capacity to know,
a not-yet-having fulfilled obligation and lastly a privation
as revealed by expectation. This admission discloses the
radical finitude of man.33 However the very questioning it-
self betrays the finitude of human reason. Heidegger says:
25
Thus, not only does human reason betray its finitude by
concerned with this finitude. It is not'a question of
eluminating the power, the obligation, and the hope in
order to evade the finitude but, conversely, it is a
question of becoming certain of this finitude in order
to hold oneself on it.34
Hence human reason is not finite because it poses
these questions, but rather it poses these questions
because it is finite, and so radically finite that in its
rationality this finitude itself is at stake.35 The laying
of the foundation of metaphysics, therefore, is rooted in
the question of the finitude of man-in such a way that this
finitude can itself first become a problem.36 Heidegger
translates this problem of the finitude of man into the
problem of fundamental ontology, in which the existential
analytic of Dasein is the central task. Only through a
disclosure of the ontological structure of Dasein can the
natural propensity for metaphysics be revealed. In Being
and Time, the ontological structures is rooted in care and
ultimately grounded in time. Care and the temporal structure
reveal Dasein as finite transcendence. Dasein is transcend-
ent because of its primordial structure of being-in-a-world,
which signifies Dasein's passing beyond to other beings into
the world and even beyond itself as a being. It is finite
because the meaning of care disclosed as throwness-possibility-
falleness can only be understood in the three dimensions of
these questions, but also its innermost interest is
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time. Hence the inner possibility of Dasein's finite
transcendence is rooted in time. Heidegger thus conclu-
des that time is the Being of Dasein, precisely because
it is time which makes Dasein as Dasein.
Now the problem of Dasein is brought into the ques-
tion of laying of the foundation of metaphysics. The
inner possibility for fundamental ontology is rooted in
the self-evident, though vague and obscure comprehension
of Being in man. The task of fundamental ontology is
exactly to discern the structure of Being proper to Dasein
in such a way that this structure is manifest as that which
makes the comprehension of Being possible.37 If rnetapysica
specialis as ontic knowledge about realms of beings is
rooted in a metaphysica generalis (ontology) then the stru-
cture of Being of Dasein is the basis for such a ground.
Ontology thus becomes fundamental ontology.
I have tried in the previous sections to present the
problem of fundamental ontology as the early formulation of
the Being-question in Heidegger's early works. The existe-
ntial analytic of Dasein remains the central task for the
Being-question. However, Heidegger gradually shifted the
focus of the Being-question to a centre around the truth of
Being. The transitory link, I think, lies in the formulation
of the Being-question into a most fundamental question of
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metaphysics: why is there any being at all and not rather
Nothing?*
The question: Warum ist uberhaupt Seiendes and nicht
vielmehr Nichts? has a few different translations which
may deserve notice:
1. in What is Metaphysics (translated by R.F.C. Hull and
Alan Crick) as why is there any being at all- why not
far rather nothing? (p. 257)
2, in The way Back into the ground of Metaphysics (the
introduction to What is Metaphysics in 1943. translated
by Walter Kaufmann) as why is there any being at all
and not rather Nothing? (p. 277)
in Introduction to Metaphysics (translated by Rulph
1,1anheim as why are there essent rather than nothing?
(p. 1)
The major problem for Hull and Crick's translation is the
insertion of another why before nothing. PV'anheiin' s
renditions, apart from rendering Seiendes into essent,
did not capitalize nothing. The Capitalization of Nichts
is deliberate by Heide ger (cf. The Way Back into the Ground
_r___
of Metaphys ics. P. 278-
Richardson's rendering it into why are there beings at all,
and not much rather Non-being? (Richardson p. 200) seems to
be clumsy and the translation of Nichts into Non-being
may present problem. I take Kaufmann's translation for it
seems to be clearer in meaning.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM OF METAPHYSICS
I. TRADITIONAL CONCEPTIONS OF GROUND
The ground-question of metaphysics is, as Heidegger
concludes in the end of his inaugural lecture what is
Metaphysics?, why is there any being at all and not
rather Nothing?1 This question, though not directly dealt
with in the lecture, is an outcome of a meditation on the
meaning of nothingness. It initiates a second step of
Heidegger's problematic in which the Being-question,
although still within the horizon of the existential
analytic of Dasein, moves into the problem of truth. Under-
lying this problem is the crucial conception of the onto-
logical difference between Being and beings. This ques-
tion is subsequently tackled in The Essence of Reason2 and
is raised again in An Introduction to Metaphysics as the
fundamental question of metaphysics. 3
Why is there anything at all and not rather Nothing?
That is the question Indeed, this question was not raised
first by Heidegger. It was asked by Leibniz in The Princi-
ples of Nature and of Grace, Based on Reason (1714).
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Nothing hap ens without a sufficient reason: that is to
say, that nothing Happens ithout its being poss- ble for
him who should sufficiently understand things, to give a
reason sufficient to determine why it is so and not other-
wise. This principle laid down, the first question which
should rightly be asked, will be, why is there something
rather than Nothing? For Nothing is simpler and easier
than something. Further, suppose that things must exist,
we must be able to give a why they must exist so and not
otherwise,
What Leibniz is asking here is the reason of things
(beings). In other words, Where do beings come from?
Leibniz's seeking the origin of beings necessarily poses
God as the ultimate reason for all contingent beings. For
to avoid the futile regress to any beings to explain other
beings, there must be a reason transcending this series of
contingent beings. A reason, which needs no other reason
for itself, must be found in substance which is its cause,
or which is a necessary being, carrying the reason of its
existence within itself... 5 This final reason of things
is God.
For Leibniz, the why of the question asking beings
refers to the reason or the ground for their being. The
meaning of ground goes back to Aristolean metaphysics.
Aristotle distinguishes two conceptions of ground:beginning
and causes The meaning of Beginning
Aristotle concludes after an analysis of several meanings
of the term, is common, then, to all beginnings to be the
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first point from which a thing either is, or comes to
be, or is kn.own'6 Heidegger interprets the Aristolean
meaning of beginning as the reason for what a being is
(what-ness), for the fact that it is (that-ness), and
for its being true (its truth)7. Along with the mean-
ing of beginning, there are the fourfold divisions of
the causes into final, formal 'bffici ent and
material.
Hence in Greek metaphysics, the question:why beings
are beings is answered along this line of conception.
The cause for any being is to be reduced into the four-
fold divisions, or further still, conceived in terms of
the material and the formal causes. Subsequently, the
Christian tradition in which a creative God is prominant,
gradually mingles with the Greek conception of the final
cause. Thus Leibniz, following traditional metaphysics,
posits God as the ultimate and sufficient cause for all
beings. This is the very point where Heidegger finds the
inadequacy of traditional conceptions of cause. The ques-
tion: why is there any being at all, and not rather
Nothing? probes into a more profound investigation.
II. THE MEANING OF THE GROUND-QUESTION
The ground-question, Heidegger maintains, is the most
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far reaching, deepest, and fundamental of all questions.
It is the most far reaching question because it takes in
beings in their totality as its object, not confining
itself to any particular being of whatever kind. Ulti-
mately it includes Nothing itself, not because it is
something, since after all we speak of it, but because it
is Nothing. 8 It is the deepest question because it probes
into the ground. Why, that is to say, on what ground?
from what source does the essent (being) derive? on what
ground does it stand?9 However, this question why does
not ask for causes that are of the same kind and on the
same level as the being itself. In other words, no being
can be the causes for other beings inasmuch as it too, is
being asked. Hence this why penetrates the deepest, and
necessarily goes beyond the realm of beings. The broadest
and the deepest question is also the most fundamental. To
ask the question: why is there any being at all, and not
rather Nothing? is to include even the questioner himself,
therefore the very act of questioning beings as a whole
must reside in the possibility of the questioner. Yet what
is the ground for this possibility?- why the why?
The ground-question is the most fundamental of ques-
tions because it is the broadest and deepest, and conversely
10 HeidegRer thus conceives the ground-question differently
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from Leibniz. For Leinbniz, the formula: why is there
any being at all, and not rather Nothing? asks for a
supreme Being that grounds all other beings, and is
therefore eminently a metaphysical question yet for
Heidegger, the ground-question is posited as the most
fundamental question of metaphysics necessarily moving
beyond metaphysics. The question: why the why? precisely
asks for the possibility of metaphysics. According to
Richardson, the ground-question means:
How is it possible that beings (independently of where
they might have come from, who or what may have caused
them, as metaphysics understands these terms) can be (man-
ifest) as beings. In other words, it is a question about
the coming-to-pass of the lighting-process of which we now
understand as the emergence of the ontological difference.
What is more, it is a question about the process as permeated
by negativity. Heidegger himself expands the question thus:
... How does it come about that everywhere about us beings
have the primacy... while that which is not a being, which
is thought of as Non-being in the sense of Being itself,
remains forotten.... "l2
The ground-question is then translated into: how is it
possible that beings can be beings? This seeks for the inner
possibility of beings as beings precisely because beings
are something but not nothing. The conception of a-letheia
as unconcealedness occupies a major position in
Heidegger's philosophy. A-letheia is the truth of Being
the lighting-process through which Being reveals beings
into beings. However it is a strange paradox that Being
reveals beings yet at the same time remains hidden, which
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is why what we can see are beings and never Being. Being
is not a being. Thus this not of Being characterizes
the hiddeness of Being. Richardson distinguishes the
two processes of Being. The hiddeness of Being due to
the not character is termed as negativity of Being.
The manifestive power that shines forth in beings as beings
is called positivity.13
Hitherto we have only outlined the meaning of a-
letheia as the truth of Being, and indicated that the
ontological difference between Being and beings lies in
the negativity and positivity of the lighting-process
of Being. However, we have to elucidate this in the light
of Heidegger's works. Thus, an analysis of the problem of
nothingness in what is metaphysics? would be necessary
in order to arrive at a clarification of the Being-question
now conceived as the problem of a-letheia.
III. DA3EIN ANJ Thh± RUJLLIvl Utj' NUTAIINU
Philosophy, Aristotle says, arises out of man's wonder
towards the universe. Metaphysical questions are man's
probing into the meaning of his confrontation with the
universe. For Heidegger, the wonder of man is not so much
directed towards the universe as a whole, but the wonder
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lies in man's sudden awareness that there are beings,
and that they are not Nothing. In what is metaphysics?
Heidegger demonstrates that the basis of this wonder
rests on the manifest character of Nothing.
What about Nothing? was the question that Heidegger
posed in the lecture to an audience who mostly were
scientists. Heidegger remarked that what the scientists
are concerned with is beings and nothing else, taking
beings for granted and having no interest in Nothing
which denies of any object for study whaa.tsoever. However,
Heidegger asked, if science wishes to know nothing of
Nothing, then is it not enigmatic for science as it has
already invoked the assertion with the aid of Nothing?15
Heidegger is cautious to formulate the problem of
Nothing. He does not ask: what is nothing? For to say
this immediately leads to contradiction. Nothing means
no-thing, therefore any rendering of the answer in terms
of beings would be contradictory. The question What about
Nothing? is to ask the meaning of the enigmatic nature
of Nothing. A definition of Nothing is the complete nega-
tion of beings-in-their-totality.16 If this definition is
taken to be a guid-post then the problem is now centred
around beings-in-their-totality, which must be grasped
beforehand, otherwise the definition only offers a formal
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conception of Nothing but never an understanding of
Nothing. However, it is impossible for Dasein, because
of its radical finitude to comprehend beings-in-their-
totality. Heidegger says:
Ultimately there is an essential difference between
comprehending the totality of what is and finding our-
selves in the midst of what-is-in-totality. The former
is absolutely impossible. The latter is going on in
existence all the time. 17
Through the existential structure of mood, Dasein
finds itself in the midst of beings-in-their-totality.18
Yet the disposition that reveals the negation of beings-
in-their-totality is dread.* In dread, beings-in-their-
totality slips away from the grasp of Dasein. What over-
whelms Dasein when beings-in-their-totality is slipping
away is exactly Nothing. Hence in dread, Nothing reveals
itself to Dasein. In the phenomenon of dread, Dasein
discloses itself in a state of spell-bound peace while
it is retreating from something. This retreating from
something is originated from the repelling nature of
Nothing through which Dasein is expelling into the vani-
shing beings-in-their-totality.19 Here in dread, Dasein is
suddenly aware of its being other than the beings around it.
* The distinction between dread and fear is classic in the
philosophy of Kierkegaard. There are objects present in fear
while in dread, no object is present. Hence dread is a fear
of nothing. Heidegger's conception of dread and fear is
similar to Kierkegaard's,yet Heidegger designates dread
fear as the ontological structure of mood in Dasein.
36
Only in the clear night of dread's nothingness is what-
is as such revealed in all its original overtness (Off-
enheit): that it is and is not nothing. This verbal
appendix and not nothing is, however, not an a posteriori
explanation but an a priori which alone makes possible any
revelation of what-is. The essence of nothing as original
nihilation lies in this: that it alone brings Dasein face
to face with what-is as such.20
What is it in Dasein that makes it comprehend there
is something and it is not Nothing? It is clear that Dasein
does not belong only to the realm of beings but transcends
it. This other-than-beings nature of Dasein shows preci-
sely that Dasein is no-thing. Dasein means being projected
into Nothing 21 Dasein is transcendence because it is no-
thing and it is already beyond the totality of beings
Nothing makes it possible for Being to reveal itself and
for Dasein to be open itself. Nothing is that which makes
the revelation of what-is as such possible fog= our human
existence. 22 Finally, it is in the Being of what-is that
the nihilation of nothing (das Nichten des Nichts) occurs. 23
Any interpretation of Heidegger's analysis of Nothing
as a nihilism is bound to be misunderstood insofar as
nihilism merely means a philosophy expounding that every-
thing is nothing.21 In Being and Time and Kant and the
Problem of Metaphysics, Dasein is positively posited as
the there of Being. Thus fundamental ontology aims at
a disclosure of Dasein's openness to Being. However, in
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"What is metaphysics? Dasein is treated negatively,
the openness towards Being charaterizing the primordial
ontological difference between Dasein and other beings.
Now, through the event of Nothing revealed by dread
in Dasein, beings manifest themselves as beings. The
wonder of beings manifesting themselves and the recogni-
tion that beings are and not Nothing, are made possible
as Dasein is projected into Nothing. This experience of
no-thing in Nothing is precisely the experience of Being.
It is clear that Being is never a being, yet a being can
only be manifest as a being if and only if Being revealing
the being in a manifesting process. This process is the
nihilating of nothing is, the negativity in beings.
Being and Nothing (or rightly understood, Non-being) are
understood by Heidegger to be one. Dasein's experience
of Being in Nothing, is therefore, the basis of the wonder.
Man alone of all beings, when addressed by the voice of
Being, experiences the marvel of all marvels: that what-
25
is is.
Why are there beings? Because beings are revealed by
Being through the nihilating of Nothing, hence there are
beings and not rather Nothing. Nothing is not simply an
opposite to beings but rather it belongs to the Being of
beings insofar as it enables beings to be beings. Heideg-
ger's answer to the ground-question of metaphysics is
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therefore different from Leibniz' s. The distinction
lies in Heidegger's profound understanding of the "why"
of the ground-question, already not in terms of cause
on reason, but rather as a primordial questioning per-
taining to the ontological truth, ie, the unconcealedness
of Being.
Here we arrive at a significant shift in Heidegger' s
problematic. The ground-question of metaphysics is actu-
ally not a traditional metaphysical question asking for
the ground of beings but rather is a search for, on the
one hand, the ground which grounds the very asking of the
metaphysical question and on the other hand, the inner
possibility of the manifest character of beings as beings.
The ground for the asking of the metaphysical question
lies in the no-thing of Dasein. Since Dasein is no-thing
it therefore already passes over the totality of beings.
Accordingly, the name metaphysics derived from the Greek
the "trans" and beyond beings as
means:
such. Hence, because of the very fact Dasein "transcends"
and is beyond beings, Dasein, by its nature, is metaphy-
sical.
Klan's Dasein can only relate to what-is by projecting into
Nothing. Going beyond what-is is of the essence of Dasein.
But this going beyond" is metaphysics itself. That is why
metaphysics belongs to the nature of man. It is neither a
department of scholastic philosophy nor a field of chance
ideas. Metaphysic 6i is the ground-phenomenon of Dasein. It
is Dasein itself.26
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The question why? can only be possible because
it is rooted in the metaphysical nature of Dasein. This
phenomenon discloses once again the important fact that
Dasein is the locus of the Being-question. Dasein can
ask why? because it is metaphysical, inasmuch as it has
a pre-conceptual comprehension of Being and at the same
time, discovers itself in the midst of the totality of
beings. The problem of the inner possibility of the mani-
fest character of beings as beings is readily clarified
due to this particular ontic-ontological nature of Dasein.
Dasein is ontic because it is a being among other beings,
yet it is ontological because Being (Nothing) come-to-pass
in it so that it has a comprehension of Being that distin-
guishes itself from beings. The manifest character of
beings as beings is gradually taken up by Heidegger as the
problem of truth, is: the conception of a-letheia as non-
concealment of Being.
However, the Being-question, now conceived as the
problem of truth, requires a prerequsite understanding of
the most important distinction in Heidegger's philosophy-
the distinction of Being and beings. The ground-question
of metaphysics suffices to show that Heidegger' s profound
philosophical question is: What it means for beings to
emerge out of Non-being, hence to be differentiated from




THE ONTOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
BEING AND BEINGS
I. THE FORGETFULNESS OF BEING
From the very beginning, Heidegger's understanding
of the Being-question, rests on a crucial conjecture that
there is an ontological difference between Being and beings
further that the great philosophers since Plato have
forgotten this very difference, hence the history of
Western Philosophy is the history of tragic forgetfulness.
The Being-question, which sets Dasein as its locus in Being
and Time, does not bring forth any clarification of the
ontological difference. Instead, Heidegger presupposes
it as the basis for the important distinctions of the ontic-
ontological and the existentiell-existential. It is clearly
stated that the ontic and the existentiell are terms refer-
ring only to beings, while the ontological and the existential
pertain to the Being that is constitutional for those beings
that exist.1 In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, the
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difference is first mentioned in relation to Dasein's
forgetfulness of its comprehension of Being. Consequently,
...In this mode of comprehension the difference between
Being and the essent(being) remains concealed and man
himself is presented as an essent(being) among other
essents(beings)2 However, in The Essence of Reason, the
conception of the ontological difference is first formulated
as the ground for the difference between ontic and ontolo-
gical truth.3 Since then, as the Being-question is gradually
shifting from the existential analytic of Dasein to a
disclosure of Being through the process of truth, the
conception of the ontological difference between Being and
beings becomes the dominat theme. But how is the ontological
difference to be conceived? If. Heidegger argues that the
history of Western ontology leaves the Being-question
oblivious, thus forgetting the difference between Being and
beings, then the meaning of Being must be brought forth so
that an understanding of the difference is possible. The
conception of the ontological difference presupposes an
understanding of the meaning of Being. This task cannot
obviously be settled in Being and Time because the main aim
of this treatise is to formulate the Being-question. The
existential analytic of Dasein provides only a disclosure
42
of the Being of Dasein in terms of care and finally
temporality. Although Dasein enjoys an ontic-ontological
priority over other beings, Dasein, in its ontic state,
is still a being. Heidegger's problematic, persistently
asking for the meaning of Being, clearly does not stop at
an existential analytic of Dasein. If this is the case,
then Heidegger would be justified to be called an exist-
entialist. In Being and Time, the disclosure of the
existential structure of Dasein demonstrates that man
cannot be understood in terms of traditional metaphysical
conception of essence and existence. Thus the term
Existential is employed to characterize the Being of
Dasein, and this is to be distinguished from the term
t' categories which refers to the characteristics of Being
for entities (beings) whose character is not that of Dasein4
Dasein, as we have seen, means an openness towards Being
ex-sistence. Hence, Dasein distinguishes itself from other
beings because of the nature of ex-sistence, though itself
ontically remains a being. This places Dasein the central
position in the Being-question. Dasein's comprehension of
Being designates implicitely an understanding of the differ-
ence between Being and beings. Thus, Dasein is not only
the locus of the Being-question but also the manifestion of
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the ontological difference. However, Heidegger does not
refer Dasein as such in his early works. The problem of
ontological difference becomes only explicit when he
focuses on truth.
However, the accusation of Western ontology because
of its forgetfulness of Being is clearly stated from the
first pages of Being and Time. This forgetfulness of
Being is responsible for presenting man as a being and it
is the task of Being and Time that this forgetfulness is
to be rescued by an existential analytic of Dasein. The
interpretation of man in terms of categories, essence or
cogito belongs to traditional metaphysics, therefore to
interpret man differently is to be at variance with trad-
itional metaphysics. Destroying the history of ontology
is the planned task of second part of Being and Time. Once
this task is set, Heidegger no longer delimits the Being-
question to the existential analytic of Dasein but confronts
the entire history of western philosophy with its forget-
fulness of Being. Consequently, Heidegger remarks, the
forgottenness of Being is the forgottenness of the difference
between Being and beings.5
Immediately, objections may arise as to whether the
entire history of western metaphysics really does not
distinguish Being from beings. Does the idea of Plato,
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the ousia of Aristotle, or the conception of substantia,
subjectivity or objectivity in later metaphysics not refer
to the Being of beings? If this is the case, what justifi-
cation does Heidegger have to say that traditional meta-
physics has forgotten the ontological difference?
This is the most important task undertaken by Heidegge
in his later works.6 However due to the limited scope of
the present essay, I can only outline the problem of the
ontological difference in its initial form as found in
Heidegger's early works.
II. THE PROBLEPI OF TRUTH
The ground question of metaphysics seeks for the inner
possibility of how beings can be manifest as beings. In
What is metaphysics? the question receives one direction
through a meditation on Nothing. The meaning of Being,
prematurely' stated, is the lighting-process by which beings
are lighted-up.7 This lighting-process, according to
Richardson, discloses the revealing-concealing nature of
Being. The hiddenness of Being, characterized by the
Nothing of beings is termed as the negativity of Being,
whereas the revealing, manifest power of Being that shines
forth in beings as beings is called positivity Hence,
* The terms negativity and positivity are not Heidegger's
but are coined by Richardson. These two terms must be thought
as two complementary components in a single movement, as in
the composition of forces. In any case, the words must not be
taken in any dialectical sense.
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negatively speaking, Nothing reveals beings by nihi-
lating itself, and in this process, Being is concealed.
Heidegger brings forth the ontological difference inherent
in it, nothingness is the not of being and thus is
Being experienced from the point of view of being. The
ontological Difference is the Not between being and Being.
Accordingly, the meaning of the ontological difference
refers obviously not to the distinction between two separate
concepts. Being and beings cannot be differentialed into
two things. They refer essentially to one thing yet
they are different. They are different because whenever
beings are, they are revealed by nihilating the Nothing
of Being. Hence this Nothing of Being is never itself
a being but rather is the ultimate ground for beings to
be beings.
The ontological difference, therefore, does not mean that
on the one hand there is a being, and on the other hand
Beira. Being 'is' itself the difference from a being, it
does not 'have' the difference. The basis of something
does not stand apart from what is based, and therefore can
have no relation to it: the basis is identical with what
is based and vet remains different.10
The revelation of beings by the Nothing- of Being
also positively indicates the manifestive power of Being
that reveals and un-conceals beings, in other words, beings
are brought to light by this un-concealing process. Non-
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concealment, therefore is the important complementary
power of the Being-process besides Nothing. This becomes
the problem of truth: a-letheia as the process of non-
concealment.
In The Essence of Reasons, Heidegger identifies the
unconcealedness of Being as truth. The disclosedness of
Being alone makes possible the manifestness of being. As
the truth about Being, this disclosedness is called onto-
logical truth. ll Ontical truth is distinguished from
ontological truth because the former only deals with the
manifestation of beings and as such, it is rooted in the
ontological truth which discloses Being. Heidegger further
elaborates.
The unconcealedness of Being is the truth of the Being of
being, whether or not the latter is real. In the unconceal-
edness of being, on the other hand, lies a prior unconceal-
edness of its Being. Each after its own fashion ontical
and ontological truth concern being in its Being and the
Being of being. They belong together essentially, by reason
of their relationship to the difference between Being and
being (the Ontological Difference)12
By ontical truth Heidegger refers to truth based on
the traditional metaphysical conception of truth as confor-
mity or correspondence. Truth, understood in this way,
means the approximation of thing (object) to perception.
But it can also mean: truth is the approximation of perception
to thing (oh-iect).13 The DroDosition there is a coin on
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the tale is true if and only if it corresponds to an
actual coin on the table. Here truth is determined by
the agreement of the propsotion (perception) to the
thing (object). But the perception is by no means an
actual coin, it only ire-presents the coin and is in no
sense material. Then what does agreement really mean?
How can something completely different-the proposition-
agree with the coin?
What is at stake here is the inner possibility of
agreement. Heidegger probes the problem into an invest-
igation of the essence of truth.* To judge whether a
statement corresponds with its object is to presuppose
that there is already a certain object present to
Dasein. The object (being) must manifest itself as
being before entering into comportment with Dasein. This
comportment is termed as the openness which, according
to Heidegger is the inner possibility of agreement. The
1114 Freedom employed by Heideggeressence of truth is freedom,
in a strict ontological sense, has nothing to do with its
traditional metaphysical usage. It designates only the
openness of beings. Freedom reveals itself as the letting
-be of what-is. (being)' 15 Letting-be is then the process
to reveal beings into their openness. Here Heidegger for
the first time identifies the Greek conception of a-letheia
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with the tieing process of letting be.
Western thought as its outset conceived this overtness as
the Unconcealed. If we translate by unconcealment
or revealment instead of truth, the translation is not
only more literal but it also requires us to revise our
ordinary idea of truth in the sense of propositional
correctitude and trace it back to that still uncomprehened
quality: the revealedness (Entborgenheit) and revelation
(Entberp,ung) of what-i s16.
A-letheia, so understood, is the revealing-unconceal-
ing lighting-process of Being in which beings are manifest
as beings. This is Heidegger's innovated conception of
truth. Being is that in which beings are ultimately grounded.
Being is clearly not a being but it does not exist without
a being. Whenever a being is present it is due to the
revealing power of Being that makes its presence possible.
Likewise, Being differs from a being by a difference that
wipes out difference. 1? The difference between Being and
beings is always there but at the same time the difference
is not present in beings that are already manifest as beings.
Being is of beings and in beings. This is the meaning of
the ontological difference disclosed by the process of truth.
III. THE MEANING OF BEING
What then, is Being? Heidegger answers this question
in Letter on Humanism.
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Yet Being-what is Being? It is itself..."Being" is neither
God nor the basis of the world. Being is further from all
that is being and yet closer to man than every being, be
it a rock, an animal, a work of art, a machine, be it an
angel or God. Being is the closest. Yet its closeness
remains farthest from man.18
Indeed, this is a relatively clear statement of the
nature of Being that Heidegger gives for the first time.
Being is not God. This excludes the interpretation that
Being is the final cause or the unmoved mover out of which
beings are created. If God exists, he is the supreme
"being", the creator of all beings. Thus God is still a
"being" and not Being in Heidegger's sense."Being does
not exist in itself, it exists as the possibility that
makes everthing possible."19 The "farthest" and "closest
nature of Being to beings clearly refers to the revealing
and concealing lighting process of Being. It is the
"closest" because without Being, no beings can "be". However,
it is also the "farthest", since once beings are, Being
withdraws itself and is concealed. That is why we can only
see beings but never Being itself. Man, in being Dasein,
is a witness to this revealing-concealing nature of Being,
because Dasein situates itself precisely in the "difference.
Dasein's ontic-ontological priority demonstrates this.
However, in the passage immediately after the above-
quoted in Letter on Humanism, there emerge two dominant
themes in the problematic of the later Heidegger. The lines
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read:
But when thought represents beings as beings as such it
no doubt refers to Being. Yet in fact, it always thinks
only of beings as such and never of Being as such. The
question of Being always remains the question of beings.
The question of Being still does not get at what this
captious term means: the question seeking for Being.
Philosophy, even when critical, as in Descartes and Kant
always follows the procedure of metaphysical representation.
It thinks from beings to beings with a glance in passing at
Being.20
Philosophy, limited by the metaphysical representati-
onal nature of thinking, can never get to the question of
Being. Once again the history of western ontology as the
history of forgetfulness of Being is raised. Hence, for
philosophy to regain its genuine root it must transcend
the metaphysical representational nature of thinking. In
other words, metaphysics must be overcome. However, in
this overcoming, there comes the question as to in what
medium" can such overcoming be carried out. Consequently,
there are two important closely related problems:
a. The problem of metaphysics and its "overcoming
b. The problem of thought and language.
Because the present thesis concentrates only in Heide-
gger's early work rather than his later enterprise, the two
problems cannot be successfully dealt with. However, reca-
lling Heidegger's letter to Richardson in which he stresses
the continuity of the early and the later Heideggerean
thought, these two problems do not therefore belong only to
the later Heidegger but are already grounded in the early
works.
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Hence in the following last chapter, I shall outline
the above problems in an initial way, hopefully pointing




CONCLUSION: THE CONTINUAL MYSTERY OF
THE PROBLEM OF BEING
In Being and Time, Heidegger keeps reminding us
that his primary problem is to search for an explication
of the meaning of Being which has been forgotten in the
history of metaphysics. The Being-question, formulated
subsequently in his works, seems to receive a definite
answer through the disclosure of the ontological difference.
Being is now conceived as the revealing- concealing
lighting process. elan is immensed in the totality of beings
that are already in their openness to man. Beings, be
them real or ideal, can only bet as a result of the revea-
ling- concealing Being process that manifests them to
"be" beings. The mystery of the forgetfulness of Being is
dissolved once the ontological difference between Being
and beings is disclosed. What man always encounters and
thinks is about beings. To penetrate into the possibility
of beings as beings is to think Being itself. Thus by
going back into the ground of metaphysics, metaphysics
must be overcome. Such overcoming, Heidegger argues, does
53
not mean to eliminate metanhvsics. says.
But this "overcoming of metaphysics" does not abolish
metaphysics. As long as man remains the animal rationale
he is also the animal meta h sicum. As long as man under-
stands himself as the rational animal, metaphysics belongs,
as Kant said, to the nature of man.1
Dasein, as the Being of man, is itself metaphysical.
Thus the overcoming of metaphysics lies in a thinking
that goes beyond the tradition of forgetting the ground
of philosophy. The overcoming means: recalling Being
itself"2 Once again, the crux of the problem is: how a
recalling of Being can be elucidated.
Heidegger resolves the meaning of Being into the
revealing - concealing lighting process. However, such
formulation immediately engenders another enigma. Being
is not a being and metaphysics only represents beings as
beings. Western language, being metaphysical in nature,
cannot represent Being as such. If this is the case, then
what can be said about Being itself ? The meaning of Being
in terms of lighting- process offers only an allegory of
Being. An allegory gives pictoral description but not
elucidation. Being is not something, therefore the language
pertaining to representational thinking of beings renders
any direct description and explanation of Being impossible.
The disclosure of the ontological difference between Being
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beings indeed discerns the difference, that beings come
from the possibility of the revealing - concealing Being
process. But this in turn deepens the enigma of Being:
ontologically, there is the ground (Being) for beings,
from which metaphysics and philosophy emerge, but what
afterall, is Being, although we recognize that there
is" Being?
Heidegger is fully aware of this difficulty in rein
and Time, he already points out,
We may remark that it is one thing to give a report
in which we tell about entiti es, but another to grasp
entities in their Being. For the later task we lack not
only most of the words but, above all the' gr ammer' 3
The problem is intricate. Heidegger has again and
again to give negative answers to the Being-question.
Being is not God, is not the ground of the world..etc.
In a later essay, The Question of Being, Heidegger writes
to indicate that there is no opposition between
Nothingness and Being.+ Nothingness and being is one, hence
Being takes in Nothingness and the only way to avoid this
apparent dichtomy expressed in language is to neologize a
word. The lack of words and grammer for Being
presents the crucial problem of a philosophical language
of Being.
However, prior to the problem of language is the
problem of thinking. To recall Being itself is to think
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Being as such and not beings. But how can thinking,
which belongs to traditional metaphysics, transcend
itself? Further still, what is thinking? In what is
called Thinking, Heidegger formulates the problem in
a more astonishing way."Most thought-provoking in our
thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking."15
The seemingly paradox is that: hitherto man is thinking
only about beings, and such thinking is metaphysical in
nature thus it forgets its own ground. "Real" thinking
consists in a return to Being as such. Indeed, we are
still not thinking Being itself. But how do we think?
How can Being be thought?
The inter-relationship between Being, thought and
language becomes exceedingly ambiguous and complex as
Heidegger's problematic progresses. The problem does not
simply lie in a reputation of the whole history of meta-
physics to establish the necessity of the Being-question.
Instead, granted we accept the ontological difference
between Being and beings, how can we know anything more
about Being besides the mere recognition of the difference:
Finally, it is clear that Heidegger's entire philoso-
phical enterprise never attempts on existentialist philoso-
phy. Dasein is but the Being of man, which "exists" before
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any differentiation of subject and object. Dasein, not
man as subject or subjectivity, occupies an important
place in the entire philosophy of Heidegger, especially
in his early works. Then, what is the position of Dasein
within the inter-relationship of Being thought language?
These problems go well beyond my present task. They
together constitute the central problematic of Heidegger's
later philosophy. Perhaps, explication and answers are
expected to be found in his later works. Or perhaps,
Heidegger's problem of Being-is so simple yet paradoxically
so complex that fifty years after the publication of Being
and Time, Heidegger is still misunderstood. In the letter
to Richardson, heidegRer writes,
This preamble is not the lament of a man misunderstood, it
is rather the recognition of an almost iisurmountable
difficulty in making oneself understood.
The question'is: where does the misunderstanding lie?
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